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Introduction. 
Any arbitrary selection of stories in the newspapers and the other media testifies to the troubled 
relationship between politics and science. Here are just a few examples, which easily could have 
been expanded in an endless list. 
“Environmental institute lies and cheats” is the headline in one of the Netherlands’ leading 
newspapers (Trouw, 20 January, 1999). The article reports on accusations of bad quality of 
research by the well-known Dutch National Institute for Health and the Environment (RIVM), 
aired by the senior statistician of its laboratory for soil and groundwater research , dr. ir. J.W. de 
Kwaadsteniet. He complains about imprecise data, lack of measurement and over-reliance on 
model-based calculations, and the lack of competition in Dutch science. MP’s are ‘shocked’ and, 
under the spell of market-oriented thinking, demand independent “accountancy audits”  on 
RIVM’s future research products. The Minister of Environmental Affairs comes to the rescue of 
the RIVM; and succeeds in securing a 2 million pounds budget increase for more observation 
and measurement. Scientists respond in a series of op-eds, in which the RIVM’s predicament is 
interpreted as symptomatic for modern science. They propose solutions that pretty much cover 
every nook and cranny of the contemporary epistemological debate. Meanwhile, the 
environmental movement keeps a very low profile on the issue; it dares not to take anybody’s 
side. Although the RIVM denies internal problems and struggles, it steps up its measurements 
efforts, initiates more and faster peer reviews, and starts working on internal guidelines for 
dealing with uncertainty and communication with its knowledge-users (Van Ast, 2000; Van der 
Sluys et al., 2002).  
Next consider a collection of stories about the continuing political controversy, Whither 
Schiphol Airport? For decades already, the Dutch government relies on bureaucratic and scientific 
expertise in airport policymaking. Yet, according to famous public administration scholar and 
policy consultant, Professor Roel In ‘t Veld, it is facing an imminent ‘administrative catastrophe’ 
on this issue (NRC-Handelsblad, October 3, 1998). 
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 (1) Bureaucratic expertise is vested in the National Civil Aviation Bureau (Rijksluchtvaartdienst, 
RLD), which is a Directorate-General of the Ministry for Traffic and Water Management. 
According to a leading Dutch newspaper (NRC-Handelsblad, October 9, 1998), for many years the 
civil aviation industry, supposedly regulated by the RLD, offers RLD civil servants and their 
families very cheap tickets if they fly Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM). Green-Left leading MP 
Rosenmöller sharply interrogates the Minister. Yet, an RLD spokesperson was quoted, stating 
that “although their is the appearance of some dependence, it was never shown to influence our 
work.” Is this evidence of a conflict of interests and possible agency capture? 
(2) Scientific expertise is concentrated in the National Aviation and Aerospace Laboratory 
(Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaart Laboratorium, NLR) in Amsterdam. Yet, confusion, 
incompleteness, conflicting evidence, and uncertainty about the quantitative bases of previous 
Cabinet-decisions has become so rampant, that the leading Labor MP, Mr. Melkert, publicly went 
on record as ‘getting absolutely crazy’ about the data input for political judgments and decisions. 
Surprisingly, a public hearing by parliament of the very same experts responsible for this ‘mess’ 
instantaneously but temporarily dampened the parliamentarian outcry. Does this mean that 
experts bungled their jobs? Or were experts blamed in an indirect political attack on a previous 
Liberal Party (VVD) Minister? Or did experts really clear up the ‘mess’, so that politicians were 
satisfied that they were ‘on top’ and the experts were ‘on tap’ again? 
(3) Also for years already, community groups and the environmental movement, supported by 
court rulings, demand scientific evidence on the possible causal connection between nightly air 
traffic noise, sleep disturbances, and potentially harmful health effects, as a pre-condition for 
further political decisions on airport expansions. Experts of the Dutch national Health Council 
(Gezondheidsraad, Gr) judge that reliable evidence will take many years of costly research, but 
meanwhile support the judiciary’s position on the basis of  an appeal to the precautionary 
principle. An inconclusive British study on noise doses and health impacts of London’s 
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Heathrow Airport suffices to stifle political debate and decision-making on the issue in The 
Netherlands (NLR, 1996).  A large-scale and expensive international-comparative study on the 
health impact of large airports by the National Health Council (1999) only results in the 
recommendation of ongoing integrated health assessment as a basis for political decision-making 
on the further development of the civil aviation system. Does this mean that community 
protesters and the environmental movement have lost trust in Dutch health experts; is the legal 
system unable to redress the executive; do business interests dictate political authorities’ 
judgment; or did health experts correctly point out a trans-scientific problem? 
(4) In Fall 1996 an expert meeting on the Schiphol Mainport debate was called on the premises 
of the Faculty of Policy Sciences at Catholic University Nijmegen. Over forty researchers and 
policy analysts presented their studies. Almost all uncritically presupposed the validity of the ‘twin 
goals’ of the Schiphol Mainport governmental policies: economic growth through airport 
expansion and, simultaneously, substantial reduction of environmental damage and nuisance. 
They only disagreed on the alternatives for most effectively and efficiently realizing those twin 
goals. Only two studies dared question the feasibility of the twin goals, and discussed alternatives 
beyond the political consensus. Are scientific advisors like the piper who plays whatever tune 
called by government and business interests? 
(5) Scientific advisors of the Dutch Government’s official think tank, the Scientific Council of the 
Government (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, WRR) have recommended that 
every large infrastructural project, among them the Schiphol Mainport plans, requires a debate on 
(national) utility and necessity (WRR, 1994). Regarding Schiphol, this has exacerbated the 
argumentative deadlock between pro- and anti-expansionists. Dissatisfied by this unproductive 
political and public controversy, in 1997 the Cabinet organized an open and interactive policy-
analytic debate between all the stakeholders on the Future of Dutch Civil Aviation Infrastructure 
(Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart Infrastructuur, TNLI). Although discursive policy analysis 
clearly shows three more fruitful problem frames emerging from the TNLI policy exercise, and 
 4
‘common sense’ political judgment endorses the idea, Cabinet refrains from new problem 
structuring and agenda-setting on this very controversial issue (Van Eeten, 1999, 2000). Were 
WRR-experts premature in their recommendation?  Or, alternatively, did Cabinet prudently 
ignore contrary expert advice by a lower-status expert with less access to political circles? Or was 
the Cabinet just caught between contradictory expert advises and acted on the spur of its own 
internal power struggles? 
 
>From whatever perspective these examples are looked at, they show a troubled relationship 
between political judgment and science-based expertise. In the popular media three cliché images 
compete for interpretive hegemony. The business-as-usual political story is that, in spite of 
appearances to the contrary, politics is safely ‘on top’ and experts are still ‘on tap’. The 
corresponding story told by proud scientists is that power-less but inventive scientists only ‘speak 
truth to power’. But the examples mentioned as ‘pars pro toto’ for the reality of the science/politics 
nexus cannot be illuminated, let alone explained by these front-office rhetorical strategies by 
politicians and scientists. There is plenty of room for a more cynical interpretation. It sees 
scientific advisers as following their own interests, unless better paid by other interests; and 
politicians as asking for advice only to support and legitimize their pre-formed political decisions. 
To the extent this cynical perspective gains ascendancy, politics and science loose credibility – not 
only for each other, but foremost in the eyes of the public at large. If we think the three clichés 
cloak a more complex reality, we should embark upon a quest for other, possibly better models 
of the science/politics nexus in our contemporary world. 
That is exactly the purpose of this essay. Its major claim is that a transgression from the 
knowledge utilization strand of research in policy studies (KU-PS) into the field of science, 
technology and society (STS) will provide us with a number of more sophisticated images of 
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science/politics boundary traffic. These two interdisciplinary fields1 claim to systematically study 
the relationship between politics and science. Moreover, they appear to have done so in mutually 
complementary ways. Peter Weingart (1983) claims that the development of the science-policy 
nexus since (at least) the Second World War can be described as a dialectical process of the 
scientification of politics or policy and the politicization of science. STS-studies can claim credit for 
showing the latter tendency (Cozzens & Woodhouse, 1995:551). STS-scholar Arie Rip (2001) 
nicely captured the gist of these findings and insights by calling for a ‘political science of science’ as a 
logical next step in STS. On the other hand, Policy Studies, and particularly Policy Analysis, has 
in fact contributed to the scientization of politics (Fischer, 1990; Hoppe, 1999).  
Since its inception in the early sixties, STS-oriented sociologists and anthropologists have 
studied the boundary work by scientists in labs and R&D work-sites. Later, the concepts was 
extended to other institutional spheres where boundary work by scientists was important; 
especially, the science-politics/policy nexus. Partially on that basis, STS-oriented epistemologists 
interested in the transmission and application of science in public policy have discovered the 
existence and relevance of numerous trans-scientific questions, emergent complexity, and post-
normal science. In the process they have gained a much better understanding of how experts and 
science-advisors fit in complex political problem-solving efforts. Whereas Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) has developed epistemologically sophisticated tools to analyze science-
in-society, it has had a difficult time to connect to ongoing societal debate and policy issues, often 
remaining remarkable naïve with respect to the policy game (Halffman 2002; Jasanoff, 1996) In 
addition, STS has remained largely invisible to neighbouring fields of social science, which often 
lightly discarded several decades of research as being relativist, contrived or excessively post-
                                                          
1 STS-related sciences range from the sociology of knowledge, sociology of science, (social) sciences concerned with technolgical 
development and innovation, any of the R&D-oriented and ‘applied’ sciences (e.g. biology, chemistry, physics, health and life 
sciences), to philosophy and history of science, and research on professions (cf. Edge, 1995). Among the PS-related sciences are 
policy science and analysis, political science, political philosophy, cognitive and decision sciences, ‘applied’ statistics, economics 
(cost-benefit analysis, welfare economics, public choice) and sociology (with lots of sub-fields), anthropology (esp. the cultural 
constructivists), (social) psychology, public administration, policy impact evaluation methodologists, knowledge utitlization 
research (cf. Dunn & Kelly, 1990).    
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modern. In recent years, political scientists and public policy analysts are becoming increasingly 
interested in STS. The combination seems almost too obvious: with the seemingly limitless 
growth of the role of experts and their knowledge in policy making, the refined tools and 
concepts of STS with respect to science and technology could be combined with theories of 
policy making and the operation of the state. 
PS was actually launched a full decade earlier than STS, in the fifties, as a prophetic call 
(Lasswell and Lerner, 1951) to harness the (social) sciences for solving practical problems of 
public policy. PS scholars only gradually lost their technocratic and essentialist neo-positivist 
assumptions about what they saw as the application of science in policy, i.e. ways to provide 
science-based expertise in political decisions and policy controversies. In fact, the topic of the 
role of science in policy has been much more thoroughly and creatively studied by STS- than by 
PS-scholars2 . By contrast, PS became much more sophisticated in science of policy, i.e. explaining 
policy change in the wider context of long term developments (demographic and economic shift, 
changes in institutional interdependencies), short term impacts (from public opinion, media 
reporting, and power shifts due to elections) on policy networks, changing political opportunity 
structures and distributions of resources and constraints, and policy domain-specific inter-actor 
dynamics. Re-combining at long last findings and insights from both science in and of policy, they 
became much more alert to interaction processes between policymakers and  science-based 
experts (Fischer, 1990; Barker & Peters, 1993) in processes of policy-oriented learning (Morone 
& Woodhouse, 1986; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993).    
The rest of this essay on the mutual transgression of PS and STS for better understanding the 
science/politics nexus will unfold in the following steps. The second and third sections 
commence the quest for better models by comparing the (dis)similarities between Knowledge 
Utilization research in Policy Studies (KU-PS) and STS. The fourth section builds upon 
Wittrock’s historical-institutional approach in constructing a property space for the systematic 
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distinction between different boundary traffic models. In the fifth section, each of the eight 
models found will be specified in terms of possible consequences for ‘successful’ or ‘productive’ 
boundary traffic. In the final section a tentative research agenda is proposed. We should try to 
discover the conditions under which some of these models may claim greater verisimilitude. As a 
by-product this may allow us to rethink the role of scientific expertise in policymaking and 
generate a model that guides experts and policymakers (and perhaps other stakeholders as well) in 
their day-to-day boundary work. 
 
1. Policy science on knowledge utilization: unsuccessful scientization? 
Policy studies is the study of the contents, processes and impacts of (public) policies in order to 
explain variations in policies (between policy domains, between countries) and policy change over 
time (in terms of direction and speed). Following Lasswell (1971), this scientific goal of PS is 
referred to as knowledge of policy. But PS has a practical knowledge interest as well. Policymakers 
and, in a democratic polity, citizens, also need to know how policy processes really come about. 
This demands optimal knowledge of policy. Policymakers who, in a welfare state tied to the rule 
of law, want to successfully cope with problems on the political agenda, should be able to 
mobilize the best available knowledge. This requires high-quality knowledge applied in policy. 
There is an obvious link between knowledge of and in policy: The more and better knowledge of 
policy, the easier it is to mobilize knowledge production for and application in policy. Lasswell 
expressed the interdependence between knowledge of and in policy by defining the policy 
analyst’s operational task as focusing the attention of all those involved in policymaking so as to 
bring about their maximum rationality. Dror (1971:50) expressed the same ambition by 
constructing policy analysis as an additional (to normal applied social and management science) 
approach for the “systematic application of knowledge, structured rationality and organized 
creativity  in the service of the self-conscious transformation of society.” 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2 The knowledge utilization studies in the seventies to mid-eighties are a possible exception; the impact on and meaning of the 
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For the policy analyst this implied the development of two skills. One, for the sake of 
mobilizing the best available knowledge in policy, s/he should be able to mediate between several 
different scientific disciplines. Second, for the sake of optimizing the interdependence between 
science in and of policy, s/he should be able to mediate between theory and practice, between 
science and politics.  Hence Dunn’s (1994:84) formal definition of policy analysis as an applied 
social science discipline that uses multiple research methods in a context of argumentation, public 
debate and political struggle in order to create, critically evaluate, and communicate policy-
relevant knowledge. Historically, the differentiation and successful institutionalization of policy 
studies in American and European universities can be interpreted as the scientization of the 
functions of knowledge organization, storage, dissemination and application in the knowledge 
system (Dunn & Holzner, 1988; Van de Graaf & Hoppe, 1989:29). Moreover, this scientization 
of hitherto ‘un-scientized’ functions of the knowledge system, by expressly including science of 
policy contents, processes and impacts, aimed to gear these functions to the political system. In 
that sense, Lasswell and Lerner’s (1951) call for policy sciences prophetically anticipated a trend 
towards the scientization of (democratic) politics to become clearly visible only later.  
Looking backwards, it is clear that policy science overburdened itself. Although Lasswell’s 
interdependence thesis between knowledge in and of policy is logically impeccable (and ethically 
honorable), it proved to be too much for the newly conceived discipline to operate 
simultaneously on both fronts. Hence, something of a division of labor occurred between two 
types of policy studies. One part specialized in developing basic knowledge of policy contents, 
processes and impacts by embarking upon a research program around the key concept of ‘stages 
in the policy process’. Another part, calling itself policy analysis, specialized in developing a 
toolbox of analytic techniques for the policy consultant engaged in producing science-based 
advice to administration and politics. In the process, both policy studies projects lost a serious, 
sustained empirical interest in the role of knowledge in policy.  Both currents suffered from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
knowledge utilization literature for the development of policy studies since the mid-eighties is discussed in section two. 
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then current belief that the social sciences should emulate the hard sciences as much as possible, 
and hence succumbed to essentialist conceptions of science, especially (economic) deductivism, 
neo-positivism, and later - to its credit - Popper’s critical rationalism (Hoppe, 1999). Especially 
the policy analysis part of policy studies, of course, had an interest in piggy-backing on the 
functional authority of capital-S science for policy/politics. At the price of a retreat from 
Lasswellian democratic and pragmatist ambitions in favor of inherent technocratic tendencies, 
policy analysis succeeded in institutionalizing itself both in the academic and 
administrative/political worlds. 
 The division of labor between ‘stagists’ and ‘policy analysts’ is far from absolute. Both 
currents keep an eye on each other, and from time to time cross-fertilization happens. One such 
wave of cross-fertilization, in the late seventies till the mid-eighties, is known as the era of 
knowledge utilization studies. In our interpretation, this period is of crucial importance to the 
recent history of policy studies - and certainly to the quest for models of boundary traffic 
between science and politics attempted here.  
Under cognitive attacks from fellow (social) scientists and pragmatic criticism from 
administrators and politicians, policy analysts and evaluators3 started asking themselves if their 
professional inquiry was really more useful than ordinary knowledge (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979). 
This sense of crisis spurred a wave of empirical investigations into the actual use of policy-
analytic advice in political practice (Caplan, 1977; Bulmer, 1978; Weiss & Bucavalas, 1980). 
Evaluating the results of these studies, Weiss (1991) concludes that it became clear that the 
findings of policy analysis and policy (impact) evaluation studies, if they arrived in the political 
arena at all (a fair amount of non-use was reported), they arrived in fundamentally different ways.  
Most policy analysts thought for quite some time that practice is best served through 
direct input of scientific data in decision-making: research today means decision help tomorrow. 
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Policy analysis inspired by deductivism/analycentrism, neopositivism and critical rationalism 
displays this character of instrumental use or research as data. Indeed, there is quite some 
policymaking that, among other inputs, depends on a continuing stream of routinely collected 
data. Holland Statistics’4 regular surveys of economic trends are a good example. However, this 
very direct way of decision support through policy analysis appeared to occur only in a small 
minority of cases; especially when research outputs enabled policymakers to do better what they 
planned to do anyway.  
Much more frequently research outputs through knowledge creep had an indirect and 
unintended function for policymakers as conceptual use, enlightenment, or research as ideas. Some 
studies by the Dutch government’s official think tank, the Scientific Council for Governmental 
Policy, are nice examples. For science this meant both good and bad news. The bad news was 
that research findings were severed from their nuances and qualifications, and re-shaped as un-
scientific, over-generalized, and popularized ‘stories’. Of course, the good news was that scientific 
findings did sometimes focus political attention in the shape of new views, innovative problem 
definitions and policy alternatives.  
Knowledge utilization studies also showed a fairly large number of cases where research 
output, as hypothesized by Lindblom as early as the sixties (Lindblom, 1965, 1968), was used as a 
political weapon legitimizing an already advocated political position, that is tactical or selective use of  
research as (advocacy) argument: “When this happens, not only are some of the data lost, as with 
research as ideas, but data are selectively lost. Those findings that favor ‘the other hand’, or 
weaken the power the argument, are sheared away in order to make the argument more 
persuasive” (Weiss, 1991:314). The only function of analysis is to legitimize an extant political 
judgment. A nice example was reported about the political interpretation of uncertainty in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 Policy analysis is a toolbox of design methods and heuristics to arrive at plausible ex ante judgments on the qualities of 
alternative policy options. Policy evaluation is a collection of research methods and techniques for arriving at valid propositions 
about the causal links between an implemented policy and its impacts, usually goals-achievement, effectiveness and efficiency of 
policy instruments. Policy analysis and evaluation both serve the purpose of well-argued and well-researched expert advice for 
policymakers. 
4 The now partially privatized, former Central Census Bureau (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS). 
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RIVM’s 2000 Environmental Audit (Volkskrant, September 16, 2000). The RIVM reported that, 
to its surprise, carbon dioxide emissions had decreased while the economy had boomed. Analysts 
could explain this finding only by appealing to irreducible uncertainty around what exactly 
happened to large buffers of oil and coal stored on Dutch soil. But politicians immediately 
jumped upon the ‘fact’ of decreasing emissions during exuberant economic growth in order to 
argue that their environmental policy had been ‘successful’.  
The cause for this disappointing state of affairs is sought in the gap, that is a number of 
incompatible characteristics of the research and policymaking communities (Caplan et al., 1975). 
For example, the policy world deals with complex real problems which do not allow complexity 
reduction along the disciplinary boundaries of science; the policy world is risk averse or even 
legally bound not to experiment, and looks for verification, whereas science is inherently 
interested in the new and unexpected, loves quasi-experimental evaluation designs, and looks for 
falsification; and in terms of time frames, policymakers want quick results for external 
administrative and political accountability where analysts need time for internal quality 
control(Henke, 2002: 3). Apart from the two worlds hypothesis, PS-KU literature has generated a 
lot of knowledge about contextual factors, issue-arena characteristics, linkage tools like 
dissemination procedures and organizational arrangements which all influence the amount and 
extent of knowledge utilization (Patton, 1997; Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Some even believe that the 
‘gap’ metaphor should be replaced by that of the ‘seamless web’; and hece propose that scientific 
input in policy should be made entirely dependent on the contingencies and erratic dynamics of 
the policy-making process (Van Eeten & Ten Heuvelhof, 1998; In ‘t Veld, 2000). Building on 
these insights policy analysts and evaluators nowadays have at their disposal “a cafetaria of 
answers to the question of what kinds of research are most apt to be used”(Weiss, 1999). But a 
great deal of this knowledge is contextual in ways insufficiently understood for a systematic 
‘toolkit’-like set of do’s and don’t’s. 
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In summary, the main impression is that analysts and evaluators have but few degrees of 
freedom in the choice of role in policy-making. As data providers they aim at direct instrumental 
use, which is usually beyond their reach. If they succeed and their input is actually used, this 
normally depends on prior alignment between their work and political ambitions. As idea 
mongers, scientists are completely dependent on the media and other idea brokers and policy 
entrepreneurs; but this may leave them rather indifferent. As providers of argumentative 
ammunition, analysts are recruited by politicians and not the other way round.  
Taking the PS-KU studies seriously, we get a rather depressing image of the scope and 
relevance of strategic science. But perhaps such an image is biased due to the immodest 
aspirations of PS’ to contribute to the scientization of politics and policy-making as forms of 
collective instrumental action. 
 
2. STS on the politicization of science and intensification boundary traffic 
STS does not take knowledge use as its analytical point of departure, but rather the producer 
perspective. Particularly, STS-research tries to uncover the unexpected impact of social influences 
on apparently pure scientific laboratory research and more applied R&D activities. The STS 
perspective is exemplified in the role of the World Health Organization (WHO) as sponsor of 
research into the best typification varieties of HIV-viruses. Although one should be indifferent 
between molecular-biological or immunological classification techniques on scientific grounds, 
WHO’s efficiency considerations in due course of time favored molecular-biological techniques 
because the results of both types of classification work could be stored in an existing molecular-
biological database (De Bont, 2000). 
 Applying critical sociology, symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology to the 
innermost workings of the laboratories (Latour, 1988; Knorr Cetina, 1995), STS-scholars have 
been able to punctuate some myths about science. The first such myth is the idealist image of 
science as producer of privileged, authoritative knowledge claims, supported by an ascetic 
 13
practice of Mertonian norms for proper scientific conduct (commonality or communism, 
universalism, disinterestedness, organized skepticism - CUDO’s). These are just the outside, 
legitimizing veneer of scientific practices and successes. Using interpretive frames from Marxist 
science studies, conflict theory, interest theory, and social constructivism, a much more realistic, 
but to some over-cynical, perspective on science has been developed (Restivo, 1995). Scientists, 
like everyone else, are motivated by self interest, pride, profit, power and the anticipation of glory 
and public heroism. Instead of Mertonian CUDO-norms, contemporary scientists de facto behave 
as if science were proprietary, local, authoritarian, commissioned, and expert (Ziman, 1990 - 
PLACE). From Olympian heights of abstraction, curiosity-driven noble speculation, innovative 
but stringent experiments, and Humboldtian institutional autonomy, small-s science came down 
to earth as a social movement (Yearley, 1988:44ff) driven by local and practical, sometimes 
openly political interests, entrepreneurial, fiercely competitive, wildly speculative with an 
‘anything goes’ methodology, and selling itself to government and big business in the race for 
financial resources.  
Thus, laboratory politics extended into the political domain. But it would be wrong to 
attribute this just to science’s institutional self-interest in finances and public acclaim. To the 
extent scientists were successful in producing authoritative cosmopolitan (not truly universal, Rip, 
1997:625) knowledge claims and upholding them in their translation into successful large 
technological projects (frequently in war-related fields, like the famous Manhattan project which 
produced the A-bomb), they were invited by politicians and administrators as useful advisers. 
Thereby politics paradoxically contributed to its own scientization; and politics at least co-created 
a public climate in which scientists have to display PLACE-ethos for strategic science to flourish. 
A second myth punctuated by STS research is that of science as ivory tower. At first, till 
the early seventies, it looked like the science-politics nexus would be just mutually beneficial. The 
institutional ‘covenant’ between the two spheres, aptly named “Science, the Endless Frontier” (Rip, 
1997) meant a high degree of institutional autonomy, lots of resources, and privileged access to 
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political decision-making through advisory positions for science. Politics, impressed by and 
grateful for science’s contribution to the war effort, rested content in expecting the same high 
pay-offs of scientific research for civilian purposes. As these promises turned out to be empty or 
merely disappointing, science’s cognitive authority waned, and politics gradually revised the 
covenant by tightening its conditions for financial support and scientific autonomy. The new 
inter-institutional contract between science and politics is now called “Strategic Science”. On the 
one hand, politics forces criteria of relevance on scientists, which clearly indicates the 
politicization of science; on the other hand, “(s)cientists have internalized the pressure for 
relevance, but at the same time have captured it for their own purposes by claiming a division of 
labor. Typical stories emphasize strategic research as the hero at the core of one or more 
‘innovation chains’ where the switch from open-ended research to implementation would occur” 
(Rip,1997:631). This, of course, points towards the continued scientization of politics.  
In spite of the fact that numerous studies of public and political controversies showed 
that science-advisors in the political arena behave pretty much like any other self-interested 
political actor (Nelkin, 1995), science somehow managed to maintain its functional cognitive 
authority for politics. To explain this paradox between continued functional cognitive authority 
and PLACE-type behavior by scientists, the concept of boundary work is very useful: ”…no 
explanation for the cultural authority of science could be found … without succumbing to the 
essentialism of Popper, Merton, or Kuhn5. Instead, attention shifts to representations of 
scientific practice and knowledge in situations where answers to the question, ‘What is science?’ 
move from tacit assumption to explicit articulation. The task of demarcating science and non-science is 
reassigned from analysts to people in society (italics rh), and…focuses on episodes of ‘boundary-work’… 
Boundary-work occurs as people contend for, legitimate, or challenge the authority of science - 
and the credibility, prestige, power, and material resources that attend such a privileged position. 
                                                          
5 In section one it was shown that this is exactly the state of affairs concerning science in policy that characterized policy studies 
for too long. 
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…Crucially, the ‘essential features’ of science are provisional and contextual results of successful 
boundary-work, not determinants of who wins” (Gieryn, 1995:405-406). 
Gieryn therefore analyses what arguments actors use to stake out claims about what 
should and should not be considered science, in light of how actors want to conquer professional 
‘jurisdictions’ for science or complementary activities. Gieryn has used this approach to analyse 
how biologists and judges tried to define science in ways to exclude creationism and hence keep 
creationism out of American high school curricula (Gieryn, Bevins et al. 1985)), or attempts to 
define agricultural practices of compost making as a science and hence claim a position in the 
research system (Gieryn 1999). Hence Gieryn’s notion of boundary work refers to the negotiated 
nature of what is considered science and what not, in order to study how actors (manage to) 
carve out a domain of cognitive authority of their science. 
Of course, one domain in which scientists have to guard their cognitive authority is their 
role as scientific advisors in the boundary traffic with policymakers and politicians. The best-
known research into institutional and organizational arrangements and practices of boundary 
work between science and politics, policy and bureaucracy is Sheila Jasanoff’s The Fifth Branch 
(1990). The most important implication of this type of research is that the controversy about the 
desirability or undesirability of strategic science may divest itself of categorical rejection or 
approval. By the careful distinction between research science, mandated science, and regulatory 
science, Jasanoff shows that empirically informed evaluative research into the functions and 
meanings of strategic science is feasible. This type of research may generate new insights into the 
conditions under which strategic science, without sacrificing scientific standards set by peers for 
certifiable truth, may also arrive at serviceable truths for better policy. Yet, STS research has 
generally remained agnostcc about about its normative implications and potential prescriptive 
application.6 
                                                          
6 Trying to save science from too much cynicism, and attempting to preserve its functional authority to politics/policy, some 
pragmatic epistemologists have moved beyond the futile quest for crystal clear demarcation criteria to rules for ‘good’ scientific 
practice in the context of boundary work at the science-politics nexus. They try to spell out the rules for ‘postnormal science’ 
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Taking stock 
Let me briefly take stock of the findings at this mid-way stage of my exploration. In politics and 
the media three clichés of the science-politics/policy nexus vie for hegemony: politics keeps 
science in place (primacy for politics); simple but inventive scientists speak truth to power 
(science as hero); and, the symbiosis of politics and science only serves their institutional self-
interests (cynical view). In search of tenable counter-images I explored two interdisciplinary fields 
which claim to systematically study boundary traffic between science and politics, namely STS 
and KU-PS. Summarizing the results, I would say we arrive at the image of an argumentative 
‘pin-ball machine’. Due to the regime of strategic science we find rather dense traffic between the 
institutional domains of politics/policy and science. One important implication is that it has 
become untenable to assume that only politics unilaterally poses research questions at science. 
Because of the ascendancy of the PLACE-ethos among scientists, science targets politics, 
whether on request or on its own initiative, with its insights and research proposals. 
Entrepreneurial scientists have become smart salesmen for their academic lore and know their 
ways around the corridors of power. Yet, although the worlds of science and politics have been 
drawing closer than in the past, they have not converged into a seamless web. Scientists keep 
accusing politicians of asking the wrong questions and under-using their precious insights. Vice 
versa, politicians and policymakers keep telling scientists that they produce usable knowledge too 
little and too late.   
Although the ‘pin-ball machine’ image refutes, enriches and qualifies the three dominant 
cliché-images, the results are still rather poor. The working consensus can be summarized in four 
rather abstract theses (Hisschemöller et al., 2001:13-15): 
- The subjectivity thesis holds that scientific and professional knowledge, however well 
warranted on logical and empirical grounds, remains subjectively construed by individual 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; Van der Sluys, 1997). For an interpretation of some Dutch initiatives in environmental policy as 
experiments in post-normal science, see Hisschemöller et al., 2001: 437-470. 
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and collective actors. These subjective constructions are products of competing sets of 
organized assumptions, standards, or criteria to assess knowledge claims. 
- The corrigibility thesis holds that scientific and practical knowledge, whether directed 
towards understanding or action, may be improved in processes which have variously 
been called empirical and conceptual problem solving (Laudan), rational consensus 
formation (Habermas), epistemological evolution (Campbell) or reflective learning 
(Schön). 
- The thesis of sociality holdt that the production, transfer, and utilization of scientific and 
practical knowledge are social processes. There is ample evidence that the structure of 
social arrangements, societies, governments, communities, organizations and sciences 
affects the production, transfer and utilization of knowledge. 
- The complexity thesis holds that what Holzner & Marx (1979; MacRae & Whitaker, 1997) 
have called the knowledge system is a socially constrained configuration of highly 
interrelated and interdependent knowledge functions ranging from knowledge mandating 
and knowledge production to knowledge distribution and knowledge utilization. The 
complexity thesis punctuates the importance of viewing knowledge-related functions and 
their products as interdependent systems of elements with properties that are at one 
subjective, corrigible and social. 
 
To get a sharper, less abstract image, we need more differentiated models of boundary traffic or 
transactions between science and politics/policy. It is amazing that such models only exist in 
rudimentary form, even after so many years of STS and PS-KU research (cf. Wittrock, 1991). Let 
alone that we have a detailed empirical understanding the conditions under which some of these 
models may lay claim to greater verisimilitude and, more prescriptively, suggest mechanisms for 
creative and productive boundary traffic. Like for ordinary people, it is obviously very difficult 
for science and politics to confront realities about your own beliefs and conduct. 
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 4. Towards an approach and a property space for the construction of models for 
boundary traffic 
Let me first try to sharpen what I mean exactly by boundary traffic between science and politics. 
Three decades of research on the use of expertise in policy making has convincingly shown that 
traditional recipes for organizing the division of labor between experts and policy makers have 
some major drawbacks. The traditional one-directional model is one in which science produces 
objective knowledge that needs to be translated into a format (‘applied knowledge’) that policy 
makers can use. What social science research on expertise has shown is that this unilinear model 
does not even begin to represent the complexities of the mutual construction of science and 
policy: the ways in which policy selectively stimulates certain forms of knowledge at the expense 
of others; the ways in which scientists do not just provide instrumental knowledge that policy 
makers use to achieve their goals, but also define problems, suggest and help to define policy 
goals, structure trajectories for solutions for policy problems; the ways in which political 
strategies can be wrapped in the cloak of scientific objectivity, or the subtle interplay between 
finding solutions for defined problems or redefining problems to fit found solutions. 
 As an alternative to the traditional model of “expertise as applied objective science”, 
policy analysts and particularly researchers from Science and Technology Studies (STS) have 
suggested that the problematic division of labor between scientific experts and policy makers 
should be acknowledged. They have argued that the traditional model should be replaced with 
one that stresses the more pragmatic nature of expertise for policy (hence the demystification of 
absolute, ‘objective science’); that acknowledges the normative or political contents of scientific 
policy advice; and that fully takes into account co-construction of science and policy, in order to 
come to a ‘more democratic’ model for the organization of expertise. 
 However, what this research has also shown, but is acknowledged only recently, is that 
the alternative recipes for the organization of the division of labor between experts and policy 
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makers are not universally valid and in fact also suffer from a number of drawbacks. For 
example, complex participative alternatives for the organization of expertise can be used as a 
policy stalling tactic or struggle extensively with the representation of unorganized or even 
uninterested actors that may nevertheless have stakes or relevant knowledge. In other words, we 
are increasingly aware that there may not be one single best model for the organization of the 
division of labor between experts and policy makers. This sets the stage for the main research 
objective: provide insight into which models for the organization of the science/policy boundary 
may be better under specific conditions. From this objective spring a number of specific research 
questions: What forms does the division of labor between experts and policy-makers take in each 
of the cases? Under which conditions do these forms operate? In addition, this also leads to the 
question: what constitutes a “better” model? In this essay I will be concerned only with the first 
question. 
 Contrary to the user-focused approach of KU-PS and the producer-oriented 
approach in STS, the focus here is on the transactions between science and politics/policy, and 
on different views of the relationship between these two institutional domains and its 
consequences for the nature and outcomes of the transactions. First, contrary to for example 
Gieryn, I will not be looking for variable definitions of science. I am looking for variable types of 
perspectives on the division of labor between science and politics. The types distinguished in the 
following typology describe the (desired) roles of scientists-as-experts and how they should relate 
to (non-scientific) policy makers. Definitions of what is and is not science, or how science is to 
be distinguished from politics, are part of this, but only one part and not the core of the project 
(as in Gieryn’s case). Apart from the way actors demarcate science and politics, the models also 
describe how actors (want to) coordinate science and politics. Thus, what I am after is not a 
typology of boundary work. Rather, the typology of variable divisions of labor presents what 
Gieryn would consider the outcome of the work: the cartographies, the discourses. Each of the 
types are sets of conceptions about the division of labor between science and politics: they claim 
 20
to be systematized versions of how actors conceive of the division of labor between science and 
politics, conceptions that can be mobilized in boundary work (in more or less consistent ways).7 
As such, these discourses can be mobilized as resources in actual episodes of boundary work. 
They are repertoires (Bal 1999; Hoppe & Huijs, 2002) used to settle boundary disputes. Evidently, 
some actors have preferences for some repertoires. The risk in making a typology of outcomes, 
of the cartographies themselves, is that the richness of boundary work, the contingencies and the 
flux of shifting boundaries and conflicting accounts of boundaries, may get lost (which is the 
essential reason why one would want to use the term ‘work’). What the ‘rethinking’ project 
therefore does have in common with Gieryn is the attempt to avoid essentialism: there is not one 
best way to organize science/policy boundaries, as there is no stable definition of science or 
politics, nor a fixed set of rules about the most desirable division of labor between experts and 
policy makers. 
Third, I will not try to construct these cartographies empirically. I start off with a 
cartography, eight maps of science/policy boundaries, based on theory. The origins of the 
conceptions in the typology are not found directly in conceptions of actors involved (experts, 
policy makers), but among philosophers and social scientists (mostly public policy scientists). 
These analysts have reflected upon the relation between science and politics, perhaps as found in 
the conceptions of actors or in the actual division of labor between experts and policy makers. Making a 
cartography directly based on actors’ conceptions would imply a systematic analysis of their 
discourse, contents analysis, or a questionnaire followed by a factor analysis of conceptions. The 
implicit claim in the following typology is that it catches the clusters of conceptions that live 
among actors involved in science/policy boundary. Testing this empirically might be an 
interesting but very specific endeavour. 
                                                          
7 Based on a cursory of definition of boundary work by historian of science Steve Shapin, Halffman has suggested the following 
definition of boundary work which appears to be more consistent with the approach followed here: Boundary work defines a 
practice in contrast with other practices, protects it from unwanted participants and interference, while attempting to prescribe 
proper ways of behaviour for participants and non participants (demarcation); at the same time, boundary work defines proper 
ways for interaction between these practices and makes such interaction possible and conceivable (coordination). ((Halffman 
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After clarifying my intentions and objectives in the construction of a typology of the 
variable conceptions of a division of labor (or boundary traffic) between science and 
politics/policy, we may proceed with the construction of a ‘logic’ or, more precisely, a property 
space for such types. I propose to construct the typology along the axes of ‘primacy’ and ‘societal 
logic’. 
The first axis is well known from Jürgen Habermas’ work and concerns relative primacy in 
terms of control and authority of one over the other. Habermas conceives of this dimension as a 
three-valued continuum. On one end of the continuum, the relationship science-politics is called 
technocratic when science dominates or displaces politics. In this view politicians and civil servants 
are fully dependent on the ways scientific procedures, techniques and thinking impact on them. 
Political goals and the choice of means are both dictated and determined by the Sachzwänge 
inherent in the powers of technology. Political reasoning and judgment degenerate into ex post 
facto legitimization for scientific insights and methods. From a democratic point of view, the 
technocratic stance is considered politically objectionable, if not taboo. On the opposite side of 
the continuum, the relationship is decisionist when representatives of political bodies have the first 
and the last say. In this view, what is politically desirable and acceptable steers the functioning of 
science and technology in society. They can merely provide alternative means for politically set 
goals. Science and technology provide instrumental knowledge; politics decides on its use or non-
use. Evidently, the cliché image of politics on top and experts on tap is rooted in the democratic 
correctness of the decisionist position. In the middle of the continuum we find a third, pragmatist 
model of politics and science as countervailing powers in equilibrium; their boundary traffic may 
be conceived of as dialogue or debate. Science and technology not only provide instrumental 
knowledge; they also critically reflect on the choice of goals. Vice versa, politics does not limit 
itself to choice of values and goals; but attempts to critically influence science’s contributions. 
The heroic academic self-image of ‘speaking truth to power’ is, of course, inspired by this 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2002), based on (Shapin 1992). Boundary work thus tends to have two sides to it:: a demarcation (separating two practices or 
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pragmatist or dialogical model, but blended with a dash of technocracy. But quite a few 
politicians adhere to this model of science and politics as countervailing powers, which they see 
as necessary condition for spirited and creative public debate (cf. the now Dutch prime-minister, 
mr. Balkenende, in Rathenau Institute, 1998:50). 
More recently Swedish sociologist Björn Wittrock (1991:338) drew attention to a second 
dimension, which he called the presupposed convergence or divergence between the modus 
operandi and operational codes of science and politics. Historically, the sharp distinction between 
science and politics as different and separated social domains and institutions emerged since the 
Enlightenment in the course of what sociologists analyze as the development of high modernity. 
Insisting on divergent operational codes confirms and reproduces this functional differentiation. 
Science and politics are considered two incompatible ways of life, whose relational logic is 
Either/Or. The two worlds or cultures or communities hypothesis in PS-KU research finds its 
roots in this functionalist ‘cage model’ of society (Halffman, 2002:23-26). Somewhat blurry 
boundaries between science and politics look much more tolerable from a relational logic of 
Both/And. In this view, no matter how different their operational codes, science and politics are 
supposed to eventually serve the same societal functions: the creation of consensus and the fight 
against chaos as preconditions for social cooperation and collective action (Schmutzer, 1994:366; 
Ezrahi, 1990). Politics generates consensus in society through social and rhetorical means. 
Science achieves the same through the tacit consensus and action coordination brought about 
through technology’s black boxing and the ‘grey boxes’ of social innovations, socio-technical 
networks, legal rules, and the models and intervention techniques developed in economics and 
the social sciences. The functional differentiation of science and politics is viewed as an historical 
contingency, to be problematized in the contemporary world of late or rather, reflexive 
modernity. The focus is not on reproduction and continuation of functional difference and 
binary codes. Rather, one should directs one’s attention to problems of functional re-integration, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
groups) and a coordination side (defining how the two are to relate to each other). 
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productive reciprocity and meaningful communication – in a word, well-organized boundary 
work. 
Where the dimension of relative primacy has found its way into daily political and 
scientific discourse, the second dimension of divergent or convergent functional logics has 
remained rather inarticulate or latent. It is a tacit attitude or predisposition permeating the 
practice of boundary work between science and politics; or a taken for granted assumption 
punctuating one’s public lip service to the technocratic, decisionist or pragmatist forms. For 
example, Gieryn’s and even Jasanoff’s use of the concept of boundary work is informed by a 
divergent functional logic, whereas those who advocate a seamless web-like harmonious 
interaction between science and politics in the co-construction of a negotiated, eventually shared 
truth presuppose a convergent societal logic (Van Eeten & Ten Heuvelhof, 1998). An analysis of 
discourses by practitioners of boundary work showed that, in spite of a clear majority in favor of 
pragmatist models, there was no consensus at all about ways of managing and organizing  
pragmatist dialogue.(Hoppe & Huijs, 2002).  
In Figure 1 I have indicated the eight models that appear identifiable from the academic 
literature. Contrary to Wittrock, whose listing of models I merely follow, I have not conceived of 
the convergence-divergence axis as a two-valued, but as a three-valued typology. I believe that 
this actually renders Wittrock’s analysis more adequately. Also, the fact that some of the cells in 
the property space remain empty, allows for greater empirical richness and variety stil to be 
discovered through research than Wittrock’s conceptualization. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Each of the models will be briefly elaborated. Attention will focus on six aspects or facets of 
boundary work that were identified as crucial for the success or failure of expert advice by 
Woodhouse and Nieusma (1997): (1) dealing with normative issues, (2) with divergent, potentially  
Table 1: Models of Boundary Traffic at the Science-Policy/Politics Nexus (Wittrock/Hoppe version) Adapted from Henke, 2002 
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(research as idea; trickle-
down theory of knowledge 
use or ‘knowledge creep’)  
 
 
  Classical Bureaucratic 
Model (research as data; 
recruitment and internal 
training theory of 
knowledge use) 
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Discourse Coalition 
Model  
(research as argument; 
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Adversarial Model  
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Modest form of 
convergent functions 
  Policy Learning Model 
(policies as hypotheses, 




 Problem Coping Model 
(community of inquirers as 
political role model; 







 Technocratic Model 
(scientists as power-
holders and/or conceptual 
‘brainwashers’) 
 
  Engineering Model 
(research as ‘social’ 
technology; external 
recruitment and 




conflicting types of knowledge (between disciplines, with lay knowledge), (3) with uncertainty, (4) 
with institutional nexus, (5) with possibilities for policy-oriented learning, and (6) with the 
creation, maintenance and erosion of mutual trust between science and politics. 
 
5. Models of boundary work and traffic. 
I first discuss models of clear primacy, an Either/Or situation. Due to their relative black-and-
white character they enjoy a lot of popularity even among scholars and politicy-makers with 
views more qualified than the media clich’es.  
 
5.1. Models presupposing the primacy of science. 
The enlightenment model emphasizes the separation between politics and science 
(divergence) and unambiguously opts for the primacy of science. Science leads to the gradual 
progress of objective knowledge of truth. It is an activity very different from politics, which 
regards values, interests and subjective judgments and decisions on collective action. Independent 
and curiosity-driven science creates new insights, concepts, hypotheses and technical instruments. 
New knowledge slowly trickles down towards the political and administrative domains. This is a 
process of knowledge creep (Weiss); scientific knowledge penetrates the political realm always 
with very considerable time delay; and politicians and policymakers never quite understand the 
how and why of the new scientific knowledge which infiltrates their thoughts and decisions. In 
that sense, science is crucial for progress! Politicians may walk in darkness and scientists in broad 
daylight, but owing to science journalists and popularizing scholars the political horizon 
sometimes dawns. However, a vital element of the enlightenment model is that scientists reject 
any responsibility for the transfer, dissemination and application of their newly created 
knowledge. It is up to the politicians, administrators and civil servants to use or neglect the fruits 
of science. Supposedly, the enlightenment model had a good deal of reality value from 1850 till 
 26
around 1930, when the scientific disciplines organized themselves in research universities with 
high autonomy.  
In the enlightenment model normative issues are left to politics. Not necessarily because 
scholars do not deal with values – they do, if only because most scientific disciplines are 
organized around small utopias (Ezrahi, 1984) --, but because scholars lack theoretical and 
methodological tools for rational internal and external debate on values. It is politics’ intrinsic 
function to deal with normative questions. Potential conflicts between different types of knowledge within 
science are pacified by respecting disciplinary boundaries. In fact, they function as conflict 
avoidance mechanisms. On the other hand, lay knowledge is unanimously labeled as inferior. 
Strict disciplinary boundaries also help in making different ways of dealing with uncertainty 
anathema between scientific disciplines. For some disciplines uncertainty is merely an error term 
to be reduced through more and better research; for others uncertainty is about human ignorance 
or perennial dilemmas of human existence.  But in practice scholars deal with uncertainty in the 
same way as with values; it is left to politics to decide how to deal with (scientific) uncertainties. 
Because in the enlightenment models the tasks and responsibilities of science and politics 
are depicted as completely different, the institutional environment lacks any degree of organization 
and firmness. In fact, contacts are largely spontaneous and ad hoc. They certainly are very 
restricted; ‘unknown, unloved’ applies here as much as elsewhere, because scholars usually detest 
politics. Generally speaking, mutual distrust governs relationships; although this does not exclude 
personal relations of trust and stable contacts between scholars and politicians – never between  
science and politics as collectivities. Policy-oriented learning in the sense of deliberate strategies 
among policymakers to make the most of combining their practical experience and scientific 
knowledge is unheard of. Spontaneous learning happens only by accident. 
The relationship between economics and economic policymaking in the nineteen twenties 
and thirties probably is an example of how the enlightenment model works. At the time, debate 
about economic policies is highly politicized, but scientifically fragmented with very diverse 
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theoretical inputs. Keynes remarked about this situation that any prominent politician, in matters 
of economic policy, was in fact the disciple of some out-dated economist, like Ricardo, Smith, or 
Marx. 
The technocracy model, like the enlightenment model, stresses the primacy of science in its 
relationship to politics. However, contrary to the enlightenment model, technocrats believe in 
strong convergence between science and politics. Since their societal functions are essentially the 
same, there can be no theoretical or methodical objections against scientists or scientifically 
trained persons as administrators or central policymakers on vital positions of power in the 
administrative and political apparatus. In the radical but naïve version of technocracy scientists 
replace politicians. In a less radical and more sophisticated variation scientists act as conceptual 
‘brainwashers’: techno-science and experts hold de facto power in the day-to-day business of 
administration and politics – not because they occupy formal positions of power, but because 
scientific knowledge and its corresponding technical-practical tools have colonized the 
administrative and political worlds (Winner, 1977; Fischer, 1990). Depoliticization is key in 
technocratic policy-making; “Good policy is spoiled by politics” is the technocrat’s adage. 
The way science deals with values usually is definitionist or emotivist (Van de Graaf & 
Hoppe, 1996:131-157; Swierstra, 2000). In the definitionist way, normative statements are 
reduced to objectively measurable progress or decline in terms of criteria derived from some 
popular idea about ‘the good’ or ‘the good life’. In the emotivist way, normative statements are 
interpreted as merely expressing a certain emotion or (temporary) mood of the speakers. In both 
cases scientists are free to impose their subjective notions about what ‘good’ really means on 
non-scientific, political normative notions; where the ‘scientific’ ideas, of course, are sold as 
scientifically responsible because ‘objective’ and therefore ‘measurable’ and ‘operational’. For 
example, in scientific cost-benefit analysis, monetarized political preferences based on a historical 
analysis of budgetary decisionmaking (revealed preference) is taken to be more credible and 
reliable than recent political promises in official government declarations or party platforms. 
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Noise levels expressed in so-called Kosten-units are taken to be more reliable measurements for 
public decision-making for airport-related nuisance for stakeholders than the ears and 
experiences of nuisance from those directly affected by airplane noise. 
These examples also evidence that lay knowledge is systematically down-played as not 
credible. Conflicting knowledge claims between disciplines are subjected to the usual conflict 
avoidance strategies; or settled simply because one discipline acquires intellectual hegemony over 
some policy domain at the cost of another one.  Uncertainty, like normativity, is immediately cast 
in the language of ‘knowing = measuring’, that is quantitative and probabilistic tools for 
uncertainty analysis are the only credible ones (Van Asselt, 2000). Ultimately, uncertainty is a 
temporary problem to be solved by more and better research. As long as scientific uncertainty is 
considerable, adherents of the technocratic model do not consider it politically prudent to take it 
into account in public policymaking by other means than hedging and more research and 
experiments focused on uncertainty reduction.  
Policy-oriented learning, in the technocratic perspective, is only possible through the 
implementation of public policy as social experiments, designed as closely as possible to the logic   
of laboratory experiments (Campbell & Stanley, 1966).  In such an experimenting policy regime 
there will be mutual trust between scientists and that part of the political-administrative elite 
which goes along with the idea of policy-oriented learning through social experiments. Those 
who object to implementation-as-experiments, for example inspired by human rights, or moral 
principles like democratic citizenship, will be met with distrust.  The institutional nexus between 
science and politics is limited to those complementary institutional forms in which politics ex post 
factum generates legitimacy and acceptability for technological and social developments initiated 
and steered by scientists and experts. 
The technocratic model is probably most applicable to the stage 1945-1970, when 
academics and professionals in many new issue areas had plenty of opportunities to establish 
policy regimes according to their own ideas about an interventionist welfare state. In the sixties 
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even US president Eisenhower warned against a tacit take-over of the state by a techno-scientific 
elite concentrated in the military-industrial complex.. It is also the stage when a fledgling policy 
studies discipline succeeds in selling the idea of depoliticizing traditional political decision-making 
processes and replace them with modern scientific administrative tools like cost-benefit analysis 
and systems analysis. Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems (PPBS) is still the most 
impressive manifestation of the technocratic idea in politics and administration. Even president 
Reagan bowed to the idea when he demanded that the Office of Management of the Budget 
(OMB) screen all policy proposals through cost-benefit analyses before taken seriously on 
political grounds by his staff and himself. 
 
5.2. Models presupposing the primacy of politics 
 
The bureaucratic model embraces the divergence between politics and science in a very 
specific form. As is well-known, the bureaucracy model is grounded in the politics-administration 
dichotomy, proposed by, among many others, founding fathers of the discipline of public 
administration like Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber. ‘Administration’ is taken to be any 
governmental action which is informed by a body of scientific or professional knowledge, 
irrespective of political judgment. As Woodrow Wilson expressed the idea: even tyrants can have 
‘good’ administration. As such, the bureaucratic model is the oldest and most frequently used 
model for the mobilization of expert knowledge and the recruitment of knowledge workers from 
society at the service of political power. Since the days of the Roman Empire, late feudalism and 
absolute monarchy the state hired lawyers, financial experts, military strategists and civil 
engineers. In Napoleontic France, the Prussia of Fredrick the Great, and in the UK special 
educational systems were developed to spot the best and the brightest in regular professional and 
academic training institutes and mold these specialists into loyal servants of the public cause. The 
trick was to let them function harmoniously in the fine-grained structures of a bureaucratic 
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organization, which without demurral and whims of its own would bow to a political elite. 
Weber, Mannheim and even Habermas have for a long time considered bureaucracy as the 
vehicle par excellence of modernization by rationalization. Small wonder that this model, during the 
stages of the building of strong European states until around 1950, was applied in a most reflex-
like manner on all knowledge workers in government. For example, Dutch departments financed 
their own research organizations and granted their knowledge workers the same protected status 
as other civil servants. In this way, next to the university system, through another system of 
quasi-university research organizations a public knowledge infrastructure was established which 
was, and to an extent still is very state-oriented.  
In conformance to the politics-administration dichotomy, valuative issues are a political 
prerogative. Values are dictated by politics, and hierarchically, step-by-step they ‘translated’ into 
rules and instructions for lower-level implementing organizations. If goals achievement requires 
scientific research, this is considered a link in the chain of implementation. Therefore, research is 
primarily considered a provider of data for instrumental learning in the service of politically 
defined goals. Conflicting knowledge claims between disciplines are bureaucratically transformed in 
rules which define task specialization or turf, and demarcate domains of power and influence. 
This constructs a certain convergence between bureaucratic domains and disciplinary boundaries. 
For example, in the BSE catastrophe in the UK the disease was, for too long, considered an issue 
for veterinarian specialists, with no business for public health experts; in designing a goods-train 
railway connection between Rotterdam harbor and Germany (‘Betuwelijn’), railway and civil 
engineers for a long time were the only players in the policy arena; ecological experts were not 
heard until much later (cf. Hisschemoller et al, 2001:454-459). The relationship between experts 
and lay persons in the bureaucratic model is an analogy of the relationship between a civil servant 
and a citizen with civil servants enjoying privileged access to information with a higher status. A 
citizen can only exert minuscule control over civil servants-researchers through his share in 
control over the political elite. 
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Like in all bureaucracies, uncertainty is dealt with through the pretense of reduction, if not 
elimination. This should be possible through the elimination of unruly and non-controlled social 
and economic (market) interactions. Bureaucracy’s aspiration is to achieve a systems perspective 
on reality and a comprehensive approach to problem-solving through standard-setting and the 
enforcement of its norms. Contrary to the technocratic model which sess uncertainty as a 
temporary problem to be mastered through hedging against risk and more research, in the 
bureaucratic model uncertainty is a permanent and urgent danger to be tamed by means of rule-
making and rule-enforcement.  A good example is the Dutch Committee for the Advancement of 
Policy Analysis in the seventies. The civil servants manning this commission desired to lay down 
rules of cost-benefit analyses in a law, so that all departments would apply this method in 
identical ways. 
The institutional nexus between science and politics is shaped in accordance with the 
assumption that the state steers societal developments. Research is part of the competencies of 
the state; therefore, a scientist is a civil servant executing state tasks. Although the state in its 
capacity as principal of research tasks in principle respects the researcher’s professional 
autonomy, the state demands his complete loyalty in exchange. This inevitably means that 
research gets embedded in bureaucratic structures, which impede the creative and independent 
aspects of research projects and programs. Research and development work gets ensnared in  
hierarchical planning an control mechanisms and acquires rigidities which cannot be squared with  
serendipity, flexibility and coherence in scientific projects. 
In a sense, in the bureaucratic model scientific research is entirely subjects to policy-oriented 
learning. To the extent it is successful, it is merely instrumental, within its bureaucratically 
determined niche. In terms of trust/distrust this breeds an ambiguous and troublesome 
relationship. On the one hand, depersonalized bureaucratic rules imply trust in the scientist’s 
professionalism. On the other hand, they express the organized distrust incorporated in 
hierarchical systems of accountability. So much is clear, in the long run it is very difficult to 
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sqeeze scientific research into a bureaucratic straightjacket. That is why in the stages of an 
expanding welfare state and the growth of a seamless web or osmosis between state and society the 
bureaucratic model is outrun by the alternative and more flexible engineering model. 
Like the bureaucratic model, the engineering model is grounded in the idea of the 
mobilization of knowledge and the recruitment of knowledge producers and carriers from society 
at the service of the state. Here too, research is a social technology for the planned construction 
of society. But unlike the bureaucratic model, the engineering model does not seek to incoporate 
knowledge and knowledge workers in state institutions. And unlike the technocratic model where 
knowledge experts replace politicians and administrators or deliberately scientize administration 
and politics, in the engineering models politicians stay on top and the experts remain on tap. 
Political leaders and their administrative staffs articulate knowledge questions and assign detailed 
research projects to scientists-as-engineers. Different from scientific researchers who use their 
creativity and initiative for the production of generalizable knowledge for solving general 
problems, knowledge engineers apply existing bodies of knowledge for local solutions to local 
problems. On this presumption science and politics are convergent activities in which the 
primacy of politics is uncontested. 
For one thing, choice of values and goals is predetermined by politics. What is different is that 
doing policy-relevant research is no longer in the hands of knowledge workers who are also state 
employees; instead it is outsourced. One of the advantages is that government can distance itself 
from conflicting knowledge claims between disciplines. In the ideal case, government as principal 
selects among the public and private knowledge providers exactly those who control bodies of 
knowledge and methods for knowledge production and legitimation, which are required for a 
complete answer to its questions. This implies a way of dealing with uncertainty different from the 
bureaucratic model. Instead of comprehensive reduction of uncertainty through rule-making and 
enforcement from a system’s perspective, uncertainties in social and economic interactions and 
ecological situations are accepted in order to cope with them as prudently as possible. It implies 
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that a government acknowledges, like other policy actors, to perceive problems from a particular 
actor-bound perspective; and usually it means that government has a step-by-step, incrementalist 
approach to problem solving. In other words, in dealing with uncertainties the engineering model 
implies that government adopts a fallibilist attitude of trial-and-error learning. 
Concerning institutional nexuses the engineering model boils down to priority setting and 
research programming by the state; and outsourcing research activities to either universities, or 
increasingly so in the last years to commercially operating consultants and other knowledge 
producers. The relationship between science and politics can be characterized as that of principal 
and agent for particular research projects (Guston, 1996). For the consequences for policy-oriented 
learning the jury is still out. At first sight there appear to exist fewer opportunities for learning than 
in the technocracy and bureaucracy models. Outsourcing of research functions usually means less 
carry-over of results into the organization; even more so when personnel policy, like in many 
governments these days, stimulates job rotation and thereby contributes to a lack if institutional 
memory in the principal. Instrumental learning by the research organizations may be stimulated 
because they have a chance to observe, compare and ‘benchmark’ many different problematic 
situations. On the other hand, their focus on single projects and resource dependency on the 
principals may simultaneously hamper the development of serious learning capacities in the 
research agents (Kobben & Tromp, 1999; Guston, 199X). The crucial fact is that neither 
principal nor research agent complete a full policy cycle except by accident. Thus, the feedback 
necessary for learning behavior will either not occur, or too late, or insufficiently. Evidently, by 
shaping the institutional nexus between science and politics according to principal-agent 
problems in contracting relationships building trust is not the prime objective of both parties; 
rather, the relationship is one of provisional distrust. After all, the bureaucracy model is thrown 
out in favor of the engineering model in order for the state to exchange one research institute for 
another one; and it is justified by the expectation that competition between research 
organizations will improve research results. 
 34
Outsourcing research governmental functions to fully commercialized knowledge 
producers like organization, policy and management consultant bureaus has increased 
enormously in the past decade. An engineering model with market-like contractual relations 
between government as principal and research organizations as agents fits a regime of strategic 
science in which the knowledge workers display a PLACE ethos, or will have to develop it on 
order to survive. But in many fields of research we will have to wait and see if real competition 
will develop; and if it does, whether or not it will bring better quality in research products. 
 
5.3. Models presupposing not primacy, but dialogue 
These models come in two versions. When the societal functions of politics and science are 
considered roughly analogous but more divergent than convergent, I speak of advocacy models.  
After all, it is the essential characteristic of these models that each voice in the political arena is 
considered to be an advocacy plea in favor or against positions defended by other political actors. 
Science is not an exception, but part of the regular political struggle over which view wins out in 
defining the public interest. The advocacy models branch in two again: the adversarial model and 
the dispositional or discourse coalition model. On the other hand, when functions are seen as 
roughly analogous with an inclination to favor convergence, we have policy-oriented learning 
models. In these models politics is not constructed as an arena for struggle, but as an ‘agora’ or 
forum for debate for a community of ‘searchers’ for acceptable solutions for shared problems. 
Learning models also branch in two sub-models: the pure learning model and the coping model. 
 
5.3.1. Advocacy models  
The adversarial model is the political pluralist counterpart of a state- and bureaucracy-steered 
engineering model. The preponderance of political pluralism is the model’s vital assumption. 
Politics is the non-violent power struggle between organized interest groups which through 
processes of partisan mutual adjustment (Lindblom) lead to temporary compromises on the 
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public interest. Both from a normative and empirical perspective interest pluralism is key; each 
group in society has an equally effective chance to voice its views and defend its interests. The 
adversarial model is the cradle of the research-as-ammunition theory of knowledge use. The 
struggle between group interests functions as variety generator and selection environment for 
scientific arguments and underpinning of political positions and decisions. Every interest 
involved will look for the type of scientific expertise which harnesses and legitimizes its pre-
formed political stance. Experts and analysts are like lawyers; advocacy is their business. Political 
scientists studying politically controversial issues with a high-level scientific content built the 
adversarial model.  The controversy over the civic use of nuclear energy is the origin of these so-
called scientific controversy studies (Nelkin, 1979). 
 In the US and UK the adversarial model was actively practiced in the nineteen seventies 
and eighties by conservative political parties through the simultaneous retrenchment of 
government research budgets and the creation of private conservative think tanks (Peschek, 
198X; Fischer, 1990; Garnett et al., 1998). Both empirically and normatively one may argue that 
scientific arguments as political ammunition improve the quality of political debate, at least if 
everybody has equal access to scientific expertise. To the extent that political controversies 
mobilize scientific expertise, they even contribute to knowledge use. On the other hand, this 
assessment runs counter to other insights which hold that polarized political positions increase 
the level of conflict to where arguments no longer count and everybody becomes over-critical 
towards scientific inputs (Janis & Mann, 1977; Collingridge & Reeve, 1986; Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1993). On the other hand, hegemonic political views also make any use of scientific inputs 
superfluous (under-critical model) (Collingridge & Reeve, 1986). 
 In fact, science’s influence is much more important in the second version of advocacy 
models. In the dispositional or discourse coalition model, politics is supposed to broadly distribute its 
attention over many different policy issues and domains. Most of them have two or more 
advocacy coalitions, consisting of different types if policy actors, which struggle over the content, 
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budgets, instruments and implementation programs for public policies on the basis of different 
belief systems. This model qualifies, or rather specifies the theory of scientific input as political 
ammunition for the political power struggle. The model starts from the basic assumption that 
successful public policy depends on more than just political compromises between political 
parties and interest groups. Each policy issue area is beset with wicked problems, and complex 
interdependencies between actors, resulting in intricate patterns of cooperation and opposition.  
Such complex interaction patterns bring together very different types of policy actors: 
representatives of political parties, representatives and administrators of sub-national policy 
organizations, (in Europe) corporatist and more ad-hoc interest groups, different professional 
and scientific or technical communities, users and other types of target groups, non-
governmental organizations representing all kinds of non-material interests, local citizen groups, 
and frequently specialized media personalities and commentators. The ensemble of this apparently 
heterogeneous bunch of actors is called a functional policy subsystem or network. They have 
their own sub-politics (Beck), that is, they acquire a characteristic political and policymaking 
dynamic of their own, due to the uniqueness of the issue or problem, the pluralism of 
represented professional and scientific c disciplines, their specific managerial and administrative 
8logics, and last but not least their continuous tensions with overall (supra-)national politics and 
its actors, like MP’s, Supreme Court judges, etcetera. 
 In order to bring and hold together such a multifarious and many-voiced policy 
subsystem requires permanent management for avoidance of heterogeneity overload. A shared 
language or style of discourse is an indispensable element. Frequently, so-called discourse 
coalitions form around story lines as a kind of rhetorical bridge between the divergent but 
overlapping scientific, professional, administrative and political communities involved in a policy 
subsystem. Story lines are held together by one or more fuzzy concepts, whose merit is precisely 
that they imply rhetorical commitment, and yet respect the divergent life words and action 
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contexts of the members of the policy subsystem. If and when a story line works successfully, the 
fuzzy concepts acquire not only rhetorical, but practical meanings and commitments to all kinds 
of practices (like consultation procedures, calculation models, norms and standards for 
benchmarking, etcetera). In other words, discourse structuration (rhetorical commitment) is 
transformed into discourses institutionalization (practical commitment and action coordination) – 
needless to say that both interact in a positive feedback cycle (Hajer, 1995).9  
 Let me now briefly discuss the similarities and dissimilarities between the two advocacy 
models in terms of our facet design of boundary traffic. It is inherent in the advocacy models that 
the fact-value dichotomy taken with considerable grains of salt. It is unnecessary in establishing the 
primacy of one over the other, and therefore one over the other institutional domain. Yet, there 
are important differences in dealing with normative issue between the two sub-models. In the 
adversarial model values are constructed as violation of vested interests. The idea is that all 
parties know their policy claims and interests; and that they can immediately judge every policy 
proposal in terms of furthering or violating one’s interests. This is not true for the discourse 
coalition model. Although vested interests are indeed easily recognizable within the constraints of 
institutionalized discourses, one may not exclude the possibility that policy actors will change 
their views about self-interest as a consequence of communications with policy actors from other 
discourse coalitions. Values are taken to be socially constructed threats to existing identities and 
practices, or rather the uninterrupted fresh discoveries of novel identities and practices. Anyway, 
the discourse coalition model depicts policy actors and anlysts as much more flexible and creative 
in their dealings with values that the adversarial model.   
                                                          
9 For the Netherlands, Pesch’ analysis of the establishment of the Central Planning Agency (CPB) for economic policy in the 
nineteen forties and fifties is a good example (Pesch, 1999). Tinbergen’s scientific ideas about macro-economic management 
functioned as a depoliticising discursive synthesis between two divergent political story lines: a socialist story line keen on taming 
the ‘chaos’ of the free market, and a Christian-democratic story line, the so-called ‘break-through’ idea, which promised socio-
economic policymaking free from the pillarized politics of before the War. Tinbergen’s scientific idea was sufficient for getting the 
CPB founded through a political compromise between Labour and the Christian-democratic parties. It proved insufficient to 
render the CPB’s scientific ouputs authoritative in political debate. This required dropping the socialist story line and embracing 
the corporatist story line by Christian-democrats. Thereafter, CPB outputs started dominating the discourse of all those 
represented in the Socio-Economic Council, and later the Dutch Parliament.  
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 Like in all pragmatist models, the equal status of expert and lay knowledge is key in both 
advocacy models. By the way, in both models it is not the case that experts bow to lay persons; 
rather scientific input helps in bringing about political consensus. But here too, the two models 
diverge their ways of handling divergent knowledge types.  In the adversarial model scientific expertise 
plays the traditional ‘frigidair’ function: refer a difficult to handle problem to the scientific 
domain in order to create time delays, which will help in constructing sensible political 
compromise for an incremental policy in which the least committing steps are taken first and can 
be revoked always. Whether or not, and if yes, to what extent and how science actually plays a 
role in creating time delays is not very clear. In most cases the outcome of scientific reflection is a 
kind of deus ex machina; how and why the outcome was reached remains a closed black box in 
many adversarial analyses. The discourse coalition model, on the contrary, is rather specific about 
science’s role. It is to provide new, if need be fuzzy concepts, which may function as conceptual 
bridges between originally separate fields of knowledge. Additionally, science may produce all 
kinds of other boundary objects, packages or objects (Griesemer, 19XX) like texts, documents, 
procedures, standardized practices, for a for overlapping memberships by experts and policy 
entrepreneurs, and what have you. In the conflict between scientific disciplines both models 
predict that the discipline that assembles the most useful functions for policy/politics will win 
(Hisschemöller et al., 2001:455-459). 
 Contrary to the primacy models which without exception consider uncertainty something 
bad, the advocacy models depict uncertainty as having positive qualities. In these models 
uncertainty is by definition abundant and takes the form of heterogeneity overload. But this 
cognitive vice is turned into pluralist virtue. After all, in the adversarial model it facilitates 
bargaining and compromise-building between the parties and interests involved. In the discourse 
coalition model too, uncertainty is beneficial because it can be ‘transformed’ into the ensemble of 
heterogeneous and contingent contexts of practice of the multifarious and polyphonous 
members of policy subsystems – and this is exactly the environment in which fuzzy concepts can 
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thrive and tame heterogeneity. They facilitate continuous monitoring and evaluation of progress 
through comparisons, however contestable; and moreover, as long as the ‘subsystem’ is supposed 
to exist under some fuzzy umbrella, it is always possible to start all over, from scratch. By re-
casting uncertainty as pluralism of perspectives, some argue that systematic cross-fertilization of 
perspectives is the road to flexible, yet robust novel policies (e.g., Schwartz & Thompson, 1990; 
WRR, 1994; Van Asselt, 2000).  
 Regarding institutionalized nexus between science and politics, both advocacy models offer 
plenty of opportunities to play with distance and overlap. This is in clear contradistinction to the 
primacy models which, by their very nature, minimize the institutional spaces within the 
constraints of their favored power position. However, in the adversarial model the institutional 
space appears to be limited to the temporary transfer of an issue form the political arena to the 
scientific domain. In the discourse coalition model, there are numerous options for the 
institutionalization of discursive spaces and organizational arrangements. Sometimes there is a 
preference for  fixed and agreed rules for access, participation and exit (like in formal corporatist 
consultative procedures); at other times one relies on open and ad hoc arrangements with fluid 
participation in policy networks with rather undefined rules of entry, participation and exit (like in 
the negotiated rule-making made famous under the label of the Dutch ‘polder model’). 
 One ought to be skeptical about the possibilities for policy-oriented learning in advocacy 
models. Learning is an elusive, over-theorized and under-researched concept, and in both sub-
models different actors may learn very different things. This is due to the fact that both the 
political compromises in the adversarial model, and the fuzzy concepts and boundary packages in 
the discourse coalition model, connect and separate at the same time. It appears very difficult to 
draw the exact line between a flexible policy and a political promise to ‘have your cake and eat it 
too’; as well as to clearly separate between a robust policy and holding on to power for power’s 
sake…  Finally, in both models an unsteady balance between trust and distrust between science and 
politics prevails. To preserve the political glue of compromising in the adversarial model, and to 
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stave off heterogeneity overload of over-complex functional policy subsystems in the discourse 
coalition model, a uninterrupted trust cycle must be in place: a continued alternation between 
trust-building measures, trust-challenging decisions and actions, and a subsequent re-building of 
sufficient trust, and so on ad infinitum. In a sentence, advocacy models require permanent trust 
work as part of boundary work. 
 
5.3.2. Learning models 
Dialogical models presuppose equal status between the scientific and political domain. Learning 
models differ from advocacy models in the way and purpose of ‘equalizing’ both institutional 
spaces. In advocacy models science is considered one among multiple political voices that enable 
political debate, judgment and decision. In the learning models all actors are constructed as 
scholars, in a sense, engaged in a process of social learning through social debate. 
 Like the discourse coalition model, the model of pure learning assumes that scientists and 
policymakers cooperate through shared concepts and strategies of technological, economic, social 
and cultural innovation. But unlike the discourse coalition model, the learning model treats the 
policy process as a sort of research process in two respects: First, a policy or policy program is 
viewed as a set of hypotheses about the causal links between certain (collective, organizational) 
acts and a specified (desirable) future state of affairs. Second, policymaking is social 
experimentation. By close monitoring of the degree of goals achievement and a careful analysis of 
the causes of deviation, errors can be eliminated gradually. Subsequently, in analogy to Lakatos’ 
qualified falsificationism for the assessment of research programs, policymakers evaluate the 
growth and decline of problem-solving capacity of policy lines and programs (Majone, 1989; 
Zonneveld, 1990).  
 In the pure learning model policy is a kind of action theory in three levels: a hard core of 
unshakeable ontological and normative first principles (ideologies), a protective belt of preferred 
policy instruments, and a positive/negative heuristic for preserving the hard core and improving 
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the problem-solving capacity by searching for novel solutions to old and new problems. The 
layered structure of the belief system largely explains why policy change is incrementalist and 
slow. As long as the policy line or program displays progress in terms of problem-solving 
capacity – thus, goals achievement is reasonable, policy instruments are usable in many policy 
domains, (re-)definition of state responsibilities is easily legitimized, etcetera – policy programs 
are assessed positively. The learning model therefore predicts that instrumental learning and 
learning during policy implementation between members of the same advocacy coalition who 
share a policy belief system or policy paradigm will come about fairly easy.  
On the contrary, learning between different advocacy coalitions who hold diverging 
policy beliefs is much more difficult, if not impossible. Only when a policy line or program 
unmistakably looses problem-solving capacity will alternative policy paradigms become serious 
competitors and perhaps achieve political hegemony or domination in a policy domain. The 
stable equilibrium of incremental policy change is temporarily ruptured by periods of 
revolutionary and non-incremental policy change. In the pure learning model policy dynamics is 
eventually cognitively determined. The overall pattern of change is one of punctuated equilibrium 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). Longer incremental changes within the same policy paradigm are 
suddenly superseded by short outbursts of fiercely non-incremental transformations from one 
policy core to another one. These interpunctions correspond to changes in the composition of 
advocacy  and discourse coalitions between policymakers and scientific experts. The sudden 
transformation of neo-Keynesian macro-economic management to monetarist and supply-side 
forms of steering economic developments has been explained in this way as a cognitively 
determined process of policy-oriented learning (Hall, 198X).  
In the coping model, learning, let alone analogies with scientific experimenting or the 
assessment of scientific research programs, is not key. This image is considered far too idealistic. 
In the real world of politics and administration it is usually not the case that one single policy 
paradigm is hegemonic. In the many consensus types of democracy (like The Netherlands) it is 
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much more frequently observed that two to four policy paradigm are active in a particular policy 
domain. Often there is a power equilibrium between those in favor of policy change advocated 
by one policy paradigm and those who can block such changes by invoking insights from a 
competing paradigm. Civil servants and other policy brokers or entrepreneurs in all kinds of 
debating fora find lifetime jobs in exploiting the tensions between policy paradigms through the 
ingenious construction of shifting minimum winning coalitions for minimally feasible policy 
proposals. The idea of sheer intellectual judgment of progression in problem-solving capacity of 
policy belief systems or paradigms is dropped in the coping model (Hoppe & Peterse, 1993; 
Eberg, 1997). In reality,  we see not cognitive learning behavior, but interactive processes of 
problem coping that, like in a television series, occur in serial and recurring fashion. To tackle 
policy problems, policymakers and politicians, interest groups and citizens, primarily rely on their 
common sense and detailed knowledge of contingent local circumstances. Only from time to 
time they allow policy analysts to have an input of their own. Policy change is a continuous 
search process through trial-and-error, at every moment threatened by the political inclination to 
try and the political constraint not to fail, and consequently the political inability to learn. 
Apart from serial adjustment through time, collective problem processing is a matter of 
mutual political and social adjustment of political positions and practices among policymakers 
condemned to each other through high degrees of mutual resource dependencies. Next to 
cognitive mechanisms, economic, social and purely political triggers condition problem coping 
processes (Lindblom & Cohen, 1970; Klok & Fenger, 2001). Some speculate about the 
relationship between the cognitive and non-cognitive parts of the coping model. The cognitive 
part is about how to bring to the attention of politics the potential solutions to policy problems 
that somehow crop up from experts’ analyses and experiments. This is called learning through 
analysis and instruction (Van Gunsteren, 19XX). The social and political parts of the problem-
coping are concerned with selecting the best ones out of the variety of suggested problem-
solution couplings. This is called learning through variety and selection. In this way the coping 
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model displays a balance between science and politics which easily fits a decisionist-democratic 
political practice. Although the problem coping model is pragmatist in nature, there is no tension 
with the models that assign primacy to the political sphere. This is clearly different from the pure 
learning model that easily lends itself to the slippery slope of technocratic rule by a politico-
scientific élite. 
How do the two learning models compare through the lense of the facet design? In the 
pure learning model, normative issues are part of a policy paradigm’s hard core, which is shared 
between like-minded politicians, policymakers and experts but hardly discussable between 
diverging groups. By a gradual increase of knowledge through error elimination, and through 
allowing normative issues to enter political debates in some sort of ethics of good reasons 
fashion, from time to time political learning processes between adherents of different policy 
paradigms do develop. In this way, gradually the politically ‘decent’ and tenable positions will 
converge in a few ‘rational’ ideologies (Paris & Reynolds, 1983). Ideological wars between 
evidently nonsensical positions – like between fascist, racist and anarchic idealogical views – will 
no longer occur in mature democracies. Fukuyama’s idea that after the fall of communism only a 
pretty unified form of liberal ideology will be perennially dominant belongs in this category of 
thinking. On the contrary, the problem coping model rejects this speculation as unwarranted 
because normative issues and truly wicked problems will always be with us. In the long run a 
cyclical movement of the rise and fall of multiple policy paradigms is inevitable. 
In the pure learning model, conflicting knowledge claims between scientific and lay 
knowledge are part of the positive and negative heuristics of the policy paradigm, manifested 
national political and academic cultures. For example, the central role for citizens in the Danish 
consensus conference model of technology assessment for the Danish parliament originates in a 
very egalitarian political and corresponding academic culture. In the Netherlands too, the 
Rathenau Institute involves citizens in parliamentarian technology assessments. But in the so-
called ‘position debates’, the Dutch amendment on the Danish consensus conference model, the 
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citizens’ voice in fact is added to the separate voices of politicians, business interests, and experts. 
A more dominating role for citizens would simply not fit into the iron cage of government, 
business and labor, other (commercial) interests, and scientists prescribed by the corporatist 
Dutch polder model and academic culture (Hoppe & Grin, 1999). Another part of handling 
conflicting knowledge claims is dealt with, in the pure learning model, through management of 
the level of conflict on an issue. If conflict intensity rises beyond a certain level, it is conceded 
that the pure learning model no longer works. This flies in the face of the coping model that 
simply assumes processes of serial and partisan mutual adjustment to be so robust that they will 
always be able to deal with such conflicts. In the coping model, interdisciplinary knowledge 
conflicts simply do not exist. In the pure learning model, it is assumed that such conflicts will not 
arise, given the dominant position of some policy paradigm. In normal cases scientific expertise 
has a natural monopoly. In pre-paradigmatic stages with potentially intense interdisciplinary strife, 
productive conflict management is a matter of prudent selection and multi-disciplinary peer 
review.10  
In the pure learning model, dealing with uncertainty boils down to the deliberate organization 
of Lakatosian learning strategies and evaluations of policy paradigms within the boundaries of a 
rational political consensus. In this way policy-oriented learning in teams of like-minded politicians, 
administrators, policymakers and experts becomes possible. In the problem processing or coping 
model, policy-oriented learning is left to a spontaneous interweaving of analysis and political 
interaction, or rather analysis in the service of continued interactions between those who are 
politically accountable (Wildavsky). The problem coping model acknowledges cognitive 
processes, but stresses unplanned instances of political learning through debate (partisan mutual 
adjustment, networking) and instrumental learning during policy implementation (serial 
adjustment, formative evaluations). 
                                                          
10 For example, in response to attacks of bias on the RIVM’s Environmental Audits, its director promised more internally 
extended peer reviews (Hoppe & Huijs, 2002). 
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As far as institutionalized nexus between science and politics are concerned, both learning 
models stress different aspects, but without excluding each others alternative positions. The pure 
learning model points out the beneficial effects of professional platforms for technical 
communities in policy subsystems; these have the required intellectual discipline for more or less 
systematic learning behavior. In the problem coping model the issue is how to speed up and 
foster the spontaneous interweaving of analysis and political interaction; and how to create, 
where necessary, deliberate new discursive spaces and accountability systems. Both models 
implicitly assume sufficient amounts and quality of trust between scientists and 
politicians/policymakers. After all, the fundamental analogies which drive the models – a forum 
for debate, and the (spontaneously) learning community of searchers – simply presume sufficient 
mutual trust. Evidently, this requires lots of permanent trust work. 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Some final remarks are in order here. First, the eight elaborated models of boundary traffic and 
boundary work between politics and science do indeed bring into sharper relief the shortcomings 
and biases in the three cliché images in popular discourse. In Figure 2 the results of the exercise 
are summarized in a few key concepts. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Second, the eight models should not be interpreted as static images. Yet, it is premature to 
speculate about temporal and historical dynamics. It is likely that a particular model will evolve 
into another one, and the resulting model may even evolve further into yet another one.11 But we 
need much more research on the conditions, perhaps different for different issues, or policy  
                                                          
11 On the basis of Pesch, 1999 one might speculate that the science/politics nexus on socio-economic policymaking in the 
Netherlands evolved from enlightenment, through discourse coalition and bureaucracy (foundation and early stages of the Cental 
Planning Bureau), into technocracy (in the sense that members of the Socio-Economic Council and political parties have to 
participate in economic discourse introduced by CPB-modelling). 
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 Dealing with 
 










































































































Table 2. Overview of (dis)similarities between models of boundary work/traffic on selected facets. 
 
 
domains, or countries, that determine why a particular model comes into being, flourishes, 
decays, and is substituted by another one. Third, we are dealing not only with temporal 
transitions but also with simultaneity and configurations or models. Like tectonic plates, the 
models have been pushed over and under each other in the course of history. The functioning of 
a particular knowledge institute may well be the consequence of the frictions, chafings and 
clashes between the different models that make up a layered boundary work structure. Fourth, 
part of those clashes and tensions may be due to the normal gap between the beliefs and rules 
actually acted upon (the action theory, or the contingent repertoire, or the back-office talk and 
practices) and those merely appealed to in accounting for one’s conduct to outsiders (espoused 
theory, or rationalistic repertoire, or front-office talk) (Hoppe & Huijs, 2002). For example, the 
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political correctness of the decisionist models may very well cloak a technocratic practice. The 
pure learning model may be a rationalizing discourse for a practice of coping; and the learning 
model itself may very well be used to legitimize technocratic practices. But, again, much more 
research into the discursive dynamics and pairings of the models is in order.  
 
6. Towards transparent boundary work?  
We need to do away with the argumentative pin-ball machine that so far appears to represent 
boundary work between politics and science. We need more transparent boundary work. The 
challenge is to simultaneously interweave the scientific and political domains where possible, and 
to separate them where necessary. And not in a once and for all fashion, but in ways that are 
flexible and (re-)negotiable. This is the only chance for more transparency in boundary work and 
traffic. How can the overview of models contribute to this end? 
 The first contribution is that, even though we do not yet know exactly, we (as knowledge 
institute, advisory body, or meeting platform for science and politics) may use the models as a 
kind of mirror. What do we publicly say we are doing, and what do we really do? Is this what we 
intended? Are we doing a good job? If not, why? Next to their use as help in self-diagnosis, the 
second contribution might be in the design of possible futures or futuribles (De Jouvenel).  On the 
basis of known historical analogies and partially supported by creative theoretical abduction it is 
possible to design and think through all kinds of futuribles. For example, one may project the 
future of scientific expertise as the new legislator or technocrat (deciding on norms and setting 
standards) who demands or gets maximum leeway from politics; or as a facilitator for consultative 
arrangements for typically mixed scientific and policy activities; or as a coordinator of exercises in 
internal extended peer reviews for many divergent local scientific review activities; or as a 
translator and councilor for all kinds of interdisciplinary, paradigmatic or local scientific and political 
differences; and many more. 
 48
 A third possibility would be to elaborate a transaction cost sheet for each model. This 
could be done through systematically mapping all costs and benefits for all involved parties for 
each facet/aspect. This would help the gradual emergence of a theory of transaction costs 
between politics and science as a branch of transaction cost economics. More empirically 
grounded views on the strengths and weaknesses of each model on each (or other) aspects would 
certainly help in anticipating and responding on criticisms. Finally, and depending on how likely 
of desirable a particular futurible is deemed to be, one may design realistic transition paths from 
Sein to Soll. This requires a much better understanding of the transformative dynamics of one to 
the other model. Combining this with better insights into relative costs and benefits this should 
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